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1Frame dependent modeling of influence processes
By Frans N. Stokman
University of Groningen
Manuscript for Festschrift für Rolf Ziegler
Introduction
In the second half of the last century we have observed a shift in focus from power
studies to outcome oriented studies. In the original power studies, power indicators were
not derived from a model of the influence process, but defined in a broader theoretical
context. Examples are the classical local power studies of Hunter (1953) and Dahl
(1961), where different measurement procedures resulted in fundamentally different
conclusions and incomparable results. Whereas Hunter defined power as a potential and
measured it by reputation ratings among leading persons, Dahl defined power as effective
participation in actual decision making and measured it by studying actual decision
making processes. As a reaction, others stressed the importance of non-decision making
(among others, Bachrach and Baratz 1963). In a comparable way, early network
approaches focused on the definition of status scores of which those of Katz (1953) and
Hubbell (1965) are the most well-known. Also early network studies were unable to
connect network positions with effects and derived influence and power from positions in
networks. The Ten Country Study on Networks of Corporate Power in which Rolf
Ziegler and I both participated is an excellent example of that approach (Stokman,
Ziegler and Scott 1985).
The shift of focus to outcomes is particularly due to Coleman’s exchange model (1972;
1990). Coleman assumed that actors have interest in some events and control others. By
exchanging control over events in which they are less interested for control over events in
which they are more interested, mutually beneficial outcomes can be achieved. The major
mechanism in this model is that of a market. The model is able to predict the division of
control over the actors in equilibrium. It is important to notice that power of actors and
value of events can now be derived from the model and are not anymore ad hoc
2introduced. Whereas the original Coleman model assumed unrestricted exchange
possibilities, later models introduced unequal exchange opportunities by connecting
Coleman’s exchange model to networks (Marsden and Laumann 1977; Laumann and
Knoke 1985; König 1997; Pappi and Henning 1998). In these models, structural
constraints force actors to exchange with particular others. Moreover, the models were
adapted to predict outcomes on dichotomous yes/no decisions. Coleman’s model became
thus extended to outcomes of collective decision making processes. Also Network
Exchange Models (Cook and Yamagishi 1992; Willer 1999 and many others) study
network effects on exchanges. Whereas Coleman’s model is based on global equilibria,
Network Exchange Models focus on network effects upon exchange rates between pairs
of actors. Splitting common pools represents exchanges and power arises primarily
because of the possibility to exclude others from exchange and is defined in terms of
shifts of exchange rates in one’s own advantage.
Network influence models also show a shift to outcomes. Weighted influence networks
were not anymore connected to status scores, but to social influence on individual
opinions and attitudes. These contagion models (Friedkin and Johnsen 1990; 1997; 1999;
Marsden and Friedkin 1993 and Leenders 1995; 2002) assume that opinions and attitudes
of actors in a social system only partially depend on individual characteristics but are also
shaped by social influence. The social influence part is represented in an influence
network, reflecting the dyadic influence of actors on each other. Technically, spatial
autocorrelation algorithms are used to capture such processes.
Third, Bueno de Mesquita (Bueno de Mesquita et al 1985; Bueno de Mesquita 1994)
stresses that the nature of politics is conflict resolution in which power dominates over
arguments or exchange. In situations of conflicts of interests between actors, reflected in
different positions regarding the desired outcome of political decisions, collective
outcomes arrive through a process in which actors challenge each other’s positions. In
such challenge processes differences in power and salience play an important role. To the
degree that the salience for the issue is lower and the power dominance for the other
position is larger, the actor will be inclined to give up hisi own position. It saves
unnecessary costs to uphold a position on an issue that is only marginally related to the
3own interests. The process is therefore represented by a non-cooperative game.
All three approaches -exchange, contagion, and power- have claimed to be universally
valid, or at least, do not specify under which conditions they are valid or not. Within the
exchange approach, no communication exists between the Coleman adepts and the
Network Exchange Theorists. The Network Exchange Theorists claim that splitting a
common pool is a valid representation for exchange, which is only the case under certain
conditions (Van Assen 2001). The contagion approach seems to be guided more by the
statistical elegancy of the spatial autocorrelation model than by a thorough analysis of the
underlying contagion process. Finally, exchange and contagion models predict in their
original formulations primarily outcomes at the individual level. When applied to
predictions at the collective level, adaptations often have a strong ad hoc level. In my
own approach I have tried to find theoretically sound solutions for that step. Stokman and
Van den Bos (1992) connect influence networks to collective outcomes by connecting
influence networks to issues on which both the positions of actors regarding the desired
outcome as the collective outcome itself can be represented. Stokman and Van Oosten
(1994) do the same for exchange processes by representing the exchange process as an
exchange of voting positions on such issues. This results in an integrated approach in
which contagion, exchange and challenge can be represented and studied (Stokman et al.
2000; Stokman and Wittek 2002). The elaborate theoretical and methodological basis of
this research allows considerably accurate predictions concerning the outcomes of
substantive conflicts.
In this paper, I would like to illustrate the need for a good theoretical basis of the models
by providing two procedures to determine influence weights for influence relations. The
first concerns influence weights in policy networks, focused on collective outcomes, the
second weights in friendship networks, focused on social influence among peers and
unrelated to collective outcomes. In this elaboration, I will simultaneously formulate
conditions under which contagion processes in collective decision making are to be
expected.
4Modeling influence in policy networks
Understanding collective decision making requires a clear distinction between ultimate
goals and instrumental goals. Instrumental goals can be considered as means through
which ultimate goals can be realized. Figure 1 illustrates typical utility functions to be
expected for both types. Utility functions for ultimate goals are usually monotonously
increasing or decreasing, like those in the lower part of the Figure. The first could
represent economic growth, the second environmental pollution. Ultimate goals dominate
in political discussions, but controversial decisions usually concern instrumental goals.
Instrumental goals typically have an optimum: too much is as bad as too little. If the
upper part of Figure 1 related to the size of an ecotax, too little would harm the goal of
reduction of environmental pollution, whereas too much would harm that of economic
growth. The preferred optimum typically depends on the weighting of the two (and
possibly other) ultimate goals. As the weighting will depend on the constraints of an
actor, different actors will likely support different optima. Moreover, as ultimate goals of
certain actors are more affected by such a measure than of others, actors differ in their
interest in the outcome. The outcome an actor i aims at is denoted his initial or policy
position xi, his interest in the issue is denoted his salience for the issue si. On the basis of
this reasoning we model collective decision making as decision making about
controversial issues with single peaked preference functions. Solutions of problems may
well require simultaneous decisions on several issues. Different issues should represent
rather independent controversial elements of the solution and as a set should cover the
full range of possible outcomes.
[HERE FIGURE 1]
The dynamics in the decision making process results from the fact that each actor, with
different intensity and potential, tries to realize his position whereas only one outcome
can be chosen. Small informal groups can often make decisions on the basis of informal
5rules and agreements. Collective decision making has to be institutionalized through the
elaboration of rather generally accepted decision-making procedures as soon as common
interests become more complex and groups larger. Such formal procedures can be found
at all levels of society. They specify, among others, which bodies have the authority to
make the final decisions, how these bodies are composed and their members selected, at
what moment which actors have to be heard or are otherwise involved in the decision
making. In addition, rules specify procedures for appeal against decisions that are
harmful or not made according the required procedures.
In a complex situation and if many actors are involved, actors will try to build an as large
as possible coalition behind their initial positions or behind a position that is as close as
possible to theirs. In that way, actors hope to affect the positions of the final decision
makers in order to reach a collective outcome that reflects their interests as much as
possible. The dynamics of decision making is therefore primarily based on processes
through which other actors are willing or forced to change their positions. The contagion,
exchange, and power models can be seen to represent three processes that precede formal
decision-making and that affect the final positions of the actors in the decision-making.
These processes should be distinguished from processes that govern the final voting.
Procedural and coalition models aim to represent primarily that part of the political
process.
Exchange and power models typically do not affect initial positions and saliences. The
result of an exchange is that actors are willing to support another position on an issue that
is of relatively less importance to them in exchange for support of another actor for the
issue that is relatively more important to them. In a similar vein, actors can feel
compelled to support another position under the pressure of power. These processes are
primarily likely if initial positions fundamentally differ because of other weighting of
ultimate goals. In such situations, arguments do not help to bring initial positions closer
to one another, so coalitions can be built only through processes that affect the final or
voting positions of actors. Through contagion, however, actors aim at changing each
others initial positions as well as the salience of these positions (Stokman et al 2000). The
mechanism by which this is achieved is through mutual persuasion. Common interests,
based on functional interdependencies, can be argued to be stronger than diversity of
6interests (Lindenberg 1997). Consequently, contagion processes usually take place within
groups and in early stages of the conflict, because in such early phases the issues and
grievances as well as the underlying motivations are not yet fully crystallized, i.e. not all
relevant information is available. An important precondition for this mode to function is
the existence of structural interdependencies in the form of trust relationships. Put
differently, actors need to be embedded into a network of friendly personal relationships,
in which they are not only directly tied to each other, but also linked via multiple indirect
ties. This structural situation will facilitate framing processes in which intergroup
interdependencies are pushed into the background. Cognitive interdependencies prescribe
that the decision makers may realize their own personal gain, but without inflicting harm
on each other. The actors have a high concern for their own outcome and the outcome of
exchange partners inside their group. Conflict strategies are likely to take the form of
mutual adjustment and problem solving (Stokman and Wittek 2002).
In contagion models, a major question concerns the weights that can be attached to
influence relationships between actors. Leenders (2002) found eleven different solutions
in the literature and nicely compares them. Stokman and Van den Bos (1992) used the
one introduced by Hoede (1979) were the weights are based on the relative resources of
actors in a policy network. Actors in policy networks do not only differ in their initial
positions and saliences, but also in their resources they can mobilize in the influence
process. Depending on the policy network at stake, actor’s resources depend on exclusive
(expert) information, financial resources, social positions, whatever contributes to the
final solution of the problem. Essential characteristic is that these resources are rather
independent of the actor’s perceptions and consequently can be assumed to be more or
less intersubjectively invariant. If we denote actor i’s resources by ri , and denote the
existence of an influence relationship from i to j by aij  the weight of the influence
relation from i to j (vij)ii can then be defined by:
7In this definition we assume that aii = 1. vjj then gives the buffer of actor j that enables
him to maintain his own position relative to others. By definition all incoming influences
(including the influence he has on his own position) sum to 1.
The amount of influence of individual i on j at time t is seen as the potential
influence of i on j. Whether i is willing to mobilize his potential influence to affect j’s
position on an issue, depends on how salient the issue is for j. An actors’s salience si on
an issue is also seen as the fraction of influence he is willing to mobilize (Stokman and
Van den Bos 1992). The position of individual j on an issue at time (t + 1), xj(t+1) is
obtained by taking the median of j’s own position and that of the actors who influence
him where each xk(t) is weighted by wkj:
Stokman and Van den Bos (1992) and Stokman and Zeggelink (1996) take the weighted
mean. The disadvantage of the mean is that groups quickly become homogeneous in their
values. We may therefore wonder whether empirical results on norm formation in social
influence networks (Friedkin 2001) are not at least partly artificial, to be attributed to the
applied method of spatial autocorrelation. We prefer the median in our present models to
increase the likelihood that minorities will be able to uphold their values on variable
dimensions within a larger group
Modeling influence in friendship networksiii
Friendship is difficult to define because its characteristics and development are diffuse
and flexible. Notwithstanding ambiguity, people agree on the fact that a friend gives
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8support, can be trusted, shows respect and real interest, is verbally open, and is a
comrade. Friendships are particularly instrumental to obtain self-confirmation and social
approval. To the extent that they are successful in this respect, they produce social well-
being (Cramer 1998; Lindenberg 1990; Ormel et al 1997). The shape of the friendship is
characterized by voluntariness, privateness, mutuality, durability, frequency of contact
and dynamics (Fehr 1996; Bell 1981; Duck 1977, 1988, 1991; Dykstra 1990; Fischer
1982). Although these features cover the whole range of friendships, typical properties of
friendships, like contents and structure, strongly depend on the stage in the life cycle and
gender of the persons involved, as well as developmental phase of the friendship (Allan
1998; Hays 1988), to name a few.
All theories imply that people do not randomly choose their friends. The very first basis
of choice for a potential friend is attraction. Somebody is generally considered attractive
if he is similar to you, satisfies your needs, is competent, and likes you. The most
prevalent determinant however is similarity. Individuals prefer friends who share their
attitudes, values, and beliefs (among others: Urberg et al 1998; Leenders 1995; Duck
1991; Hallinan and Teixeira 1987; Brehm 1985; Dahlbäck 1982; Werner and Parmelee
1979).iv Other attraction forces, however, may promote friendships among dissimilar
individuals. Davison and Jones (1976), for example, report a generally observed
attraction to higher status individuals. Once two individuals have decided that they want
to be in a friendship, they develop similar attitudes and interests, which implies rewards
by providing social comparison from both sides over and over again (Newcomb 1956,
1961; Schachter 1959).
The model: Goal directed friendship formation
The main driving force behind friendships and friendship formation lies in the
observation that individuals differ in their preferences regarding the desired
characteristics of their friends. These differences are twofold. First, a characteristic or
dimension considered important by one individual might well be irrelevant for another
individual. For example, some individuals attach high importance to the fact that their
friends are in a certain age range or have certain political views, whereas other
individuals do not care about age or political views of their friends. We call the
9importance of a dimension for an individual the salience of that dimension for that
individual. Second, for a certain dimension, like age, individuals differ in the preferred
value their friends should have on that dimension. Some individuals prefer friends of
their own age; others prefer friends that are older or younger than they are. We call such a
preferred value for their friends the individual’s ideal-friend-value on the dimension. As
this example shows, the ideal-friend-value may be equal to the individual’s own value on
the dimension but that is not necessarily the case. It is crucial, however, that differences
exist among individuals in the meaning of dimensions: thus as we call it, in the saliences
attached to them, and in the positioning of self and others on these dimensions. It may
even be so that dependent on the individual's ideal-friend-value on a dimension he
attaches more or less salience to that dimension (Jones 1982). It is for example found that
individuals on the extreme of a dimension attach more importance to that dimension
(Hirschberg et al 1978).
In our model, we assume that the relevant dimensions are unidimensional and scaled
between 0 and 1. The larger the distance between the actual value of a (potential) friend
and the individual's ideal-friend-value on a dimension, the higher the costs for that
individual to establish or maintain a friendship with that individual; the higher the
individual’s salience for the dimension, the higher the contribution of the distance to the
costs. This corresponds to Jones' (1982) suggestion to model the strength of a similarity-
attraction relationship as an inverse function of distance between the implicit ideal point
of an individual and the other's value on the relevant dimension.
Let us consider individuals i and j (i,j = 1,...,n) and m dimensions (e=1,...,m). We denote
individual i's ideal-friend-value on dimension e by xie and i's salience by sie with 0 ≤ xie,
sie ≤ 1. The actual value of individual j on dimension e is yje. The contribution of  j's
characteristics to the overall costs (C ij ) for individual i for having a friendship with
individual j can now be defined as follows:





The square root in equation (1) indicates that deviations around the ideal-friend-value
result in a larger increase in costs than deviations far away. For individuals with the same
ideal-friend-values, costs in making and maintaining friendships are higher for
individuals with stronger preferences (salience) on the dimensions. For individuals with
different ideal-friend-values but with the same saliences, costs for making and
maintaining friendships depend on the availability of others with desired characteristics.
We use this cost function as the basis for our measure for influence.
With respect to attractions to or preferences for friends, three types of attraction forces
seem to be generally important, but always apply with specific 'adaptations' in specific
contexts (Davison and Jones 1976).
The most important type is that of likeness or similarity: individuals prefer friendships
with individuals who are similar to themselves (among others: Lazersfeld and Merton
1954; Duck 1991). In that case, the individual's ideal-friend-value is equal to that
individual's own actual value: xie = yie in Equation (1). If this applies to all individuals on
a dimension, we speak of a similarity dimension. Examples of similarity dimensions are
variable attributes like opinions, attitudes, and behaviors, and non-variable characteristics
like gender.
Individuals do not exclusively aim at similar friends in all circumstances. We can
distinguish two different attractive forces for dissimilar friends. The first is known from
reference group theory (Festinger 1954; Schachter 1959). If an individual would like to
belong to a group to which he does not belong, he will be attracted to (potential) friends
with characteristics dominant in that group. The generally observed attraction to higher
status individuals (Davison and Jones 1976) is related to this. Status and, more generally,
reference group characteristics can be introduced through ideal-friend-values where xie is
equal to, for example, the average value of the aspired group and consequently unequal
to yie if i does not belong to that group. If this applies to all individuals on a dimension,
we speak of an aspiration dimension.
The other attractive force for dissimilar friends stems from the desire to have friends with
complementary characteristics. Becker (1991) demonstrated the importance of
complementarity in social selection for marriage markets. In friendship formation,
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complementarity certainly applies in specific settings, such as organizations. Again the
ideal-friend-value of the individual is unequal to the individual's actual value, but the
individual has no aspiration to reach that value for himself. We speak of complementary
dimensions if all individuals seek friends with complementary values on such a
dimension.
Influencing
The influence process describes how some individual characteristics change as a result of
their friendships. In the literature on social influence processes, the emphasis lies on
changes of individual characteristics like opinions, attitudes, behaviors that would
become more similar. According to Hunter et al. (1984), different theories exist that try to
explain how attitude change comes about. Literature on influence networks typically does
not question the targets of influence and usually confine the influence process to (a subset
of) opinions, attitudes and behavior (Festinger 1954; French 1956; Friedkin 1986;
Marsden and Friedkin 1993 Friedkin and Johnsen 1990; 1997; 1999; Friedkin 1999).
From our model, we can derive three possible targets for social influence: the ideal-
friend-values, the saliences, and the actual values of the individuals on the dimensions.
The latter are confined to those dimensions that are subject to social influence (like
behavior, opinions, or attitudes opposed to characteristics like gender or age). The
influence process can result in changes in any of the three values or in any combination
of them. We assume that the strength with which individual i influences j depends on j’s
evaluation of i’s characteristics. The more i’s characteristics match with j’s ideal-friend-
values on highly salient dimensions, the higher the evaluation of the friendship by j and
the more weight i will have on j’s saliences, ideal-friend-values, and actual values. This is
a generalization of the social comparison theory of Festinger (1954), stating that
influence between actors declines as a function of the discrepancy of their opinions and
behavior. This implies that influence processes in friendship networks are not based on
objective resources like money, social position, or expertise, but on pair wise evaluations
of the other’s characteristics. Resources of an individual as such differ for every pair of
individuals, and are by definition not symmetric (direction dependent). We define rij as
12
the value of i’s resources from j’s viewpoint over all dimensions e. The smaller the
differences between i’s actual values and j’s preferred values on the dimensions, the
larger the resources of i with regard to j.




The definition includes the resources of an individual with regard to himself, rjj . The
more the individual’s ideal-friend-values match with his own actual ones for highly
salient dimensions, the higher the resources of j with respect to himself. The higher the
resources with respect to himself, the more difficult it is for others to influence j.
The influence of a friend does not only depend on the friend's resources, but also on the
resources of the individual's other friends and the individual's own resources over
himself. The amount of control vij(t) of i over j is defined as followsv (see also Stokman
and Van den Bos 1992):
where
aij(t) = 0 if i and j are not friends at time t
aij(t) = 1 if i and j are friends at time t.
Since we assume a friendship to exist as soon as choice is mutual, aij(t) = aji(t).
For each individual, by definition, all incoming control (including the control over
himself) sums to unity.
When saliences are subject to social influence, we assume that the salience of individual i
for dimension e at time (t+1), sie(t+1), is the median of i’s own and i’s friends’ saliences
at time t where each sje(t) is weighted by vji(t).
Social influence on actual and ideal-friend-values depends not only on the amount of
control, but also on the saliences individuals attach to the dimensions. The amount of
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control of individual j on i at time t is seen as the potential influence of j on i. Whether j
is willing to mobilize his potential control to affect i’s value on a variable dimension,
depends on how salient the dimension is for j. An individual’s salience on a dimension is
seen as the fraction of control he is willing to mobilize (Stokman and Van den Bos 1992).
The ideal and actual value of individual i on (variable) dimension e at time (t + 1),
xie(t+1) and yie(t+1) respectively, are obtained by taking the median of i’s own and i’s
friends’ values at time t where each xje(t) and yje(t) are weighted by wji(t):
The above reflections on the determining elements for influence processes and the
derived definitions can directly be used in simulation models. One of the ever-returning
questions is whether friends tend to be likeminded because of selection or contagion. In
other words, do friends select likeminded friends or do friends become likeminded
through their frequent interactions? As in empirical settings both processes are difficult to
disentangle, dynamic process simulation may help to separate the effects of selection and
contagion on friendship structures in equilibrium. In a forthcoming study, Stokman and
Zeggelink (forthcoming) will show, for example, that contagion will substantially
increase segregation in friendship networks. Van Duijn et al (2003) show that these
reflections are also useful for the derivation of hypotheses in empirical research and as
yardsticks for questions in friendship studies.
Conclusions
We find three broad modes of influence processes in the literature: contagion, exchange
and power. For each, models have been devised but researchers neglected the important
question under which condition which mode is more likely to take place. The models are,
consequently, around as universally valid models, but they aren’t. In this paper, I argued
that each mode can be seen as a cognitive frame and I specified the conditions under
which the contagion frame is likely to occur by a careful analysis of the process
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underlying contagion. Existing contagion models never did that and are strongly driven
by the statistical elegancy of spatial autocorrelation. On the basis of a careful analysis of
influence processes in policy networks and friendship networks, I specified domain
specific influence models that are based on theoretical elegancy rather than statistical
elegancy. The specified models show both similarities and differences with spatial
autocorrelation models. Moreover, they give important directions for further
specifications of the targets of influence and for specification of important parameters,
like the influence weights. Like in spatial autocorrelation models, social influence is
defined as a process that operates through a matrix of weighted influence relations where
the total incoming influence on an actor sums to 1. Our influence definitions are also a
generalization of that of French (1956) (namely if all rij’s are equal to 1, assuming we
would not take the median but the mean value). Our approach has, however, an important
advantage above the existing spatial autocorrelation models, namely that the weights in
the matrix, including those on the diagonal, are theoretically derived and can easily be
determined in empirical research. Another important difference with the spatial
autocorrelation models has to do with their assumption that only a certain part of the
individual’s characteristics is socially determined, whereas the remainder is determined
by individual characteristics. The size of the socially determined part depends on a
parameter α. It should be realized that α is a system parameter that does not dependent on
the individual. In our approach the individual is neither completely determined by his
social environment. His resources over himself (the diagonal values in the weight matrix)
determine his resistance to social influence. These values vary over individuals,
depending on how much importance the individual attaches to these characteristics and
how satisfied he is with their values. In addition, social influence is limited in our model
because individuals attach little weight to others that deviate strongly from their ideal-
friend-values on highly important dimensions. By modeling the limitation to social
influence in this way, our models are much stronger related to social comparison theories
than spatial autocorrelation models.
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Figure 1: Utility functions of Instrumental (upper part) and ultimate goals (lower
part)
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i  Whenever we refer to an individual in the male form, we mean to refer to the female form too.
ii  In the literature the weight of the influence relation from i to j is often denoted by wji . The reader should
be aware that in this paper vij does not refer to the influence from j to i but that from i to j.
iii  This section is based on collaborative work of Evelien Zeggelink and myself, particularly Stokman and
Zeggelink (1996) and a forthcoming article on effects of selection and influence in friendship networks.
First empirical results can be found in Van Duijn  et al. (2003).
iv This is not surprising because equality plays an important role in a potential relationship. It is easier to
treat a similar individual as an equal than a dissimilar individual. Moreover, similarity is reinforcing in
itself, it provides a good basis for assuming positive outcomes in subsequent interactions, it makes
communication easier and it justifies the self. Similarity is particularly important for behavioral
confirmation, as similar individuals tend to behave in a similar way (Lindenberg 1990).
v As cij and the next concepts are directly related to the social influence process in each iteration, we
explicitly formulate in the coming equations which elements are time-dependent or not. The pair-dependent
resources rij are time dependent when the individuals values on one or more dimensions (salience, ideal-
friend-value, and/or actual value) are subject to social influence.
